It is the presumptive thesis of William Lyons that an examination of introspection, though more a historical than a current topic in philosophy and psychology, still has much substance for today's scholar. By introspection, he means the direct access to mental knowledge, as it has been written about over the centuries from Augustine to Descartes to the empiricists, and as it has been developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an experimental method in psychology by Wundt, James, (...) and Titchener. Lyons is chiefly concerned with whether introspection exists as a possible form of knowing, not with its applications. Since he finds all past attempts to demonstrate the valid existence of introspection unsatisfactory, he turns to contemporary philosophy and psychology to determine whether, even if they cannot justify introspection, they can shed light on why such a long-running conceptual illusion existed in the past and, in several guises, continues to exist. Here Lyons puts us on contemporary ground with descriptions of brain scanners, Turing machines, computer-program possibilities, behaviorist tactics, and Rylean moves. The first section bears the general title "The Dethronement of Introspection," while the second section, emphasizing the computer models of Daniel Dennett, is titled "The Mechanization of Introspection." But, unhappily, all the contemporary approaches are also judged unsatisfactory in justifying introspection. We are, however, given some hints that the illusion of introspection's existence must rest in our culture's folk psychology, "which has changed little over the last thousand years or more.". (shrink)